Ultra-Luxury Property Quarterly Q1 2026: GCB & $10M+ Condo Market

Ultra Luxury Quarterly Last reviewed

Q1 2026 marked the third consecutive quarter in which Singapore’s ultra-luxury segment behaved like two markets in one shell: a thin but firm S$10M+ condo tier (early caveat counts point to roughly 22–28 transactions in the Core Central Region) and a Good Class Bungalow market where headline values continued to compound off the strong 2025 base, even as MAS’s tighter Section 13O/13U family-office regime reshaped the buyer mix (as of 2026-04).

The opening quarter of 2026 was not supposed to be quiet, and it was not. Three structural forces converged on Singapore’s ultra-luxury market between January and March: the cumulative effect of the April 2023 ABSD framework (still 60% on foreigners, 65% on entities), the post-2024 reset of MAS’s family-office tax-incentive regime under tightened Section 13O and 13U criteria, and a measurably stronger Singapore-dollar wealth base reflected in MAS’s 2025 asset-management survey (as of 2026-03).

Against that backdrop, URA’s Q1 2026 flash estimate recorded the private residential price index ticking up modestly, with the Core Central Region (CCR) again leading on price growth even though volumes remained well below the 2021–2022 cycle peak. For ultra-high-net-worth buyers and their advisers, the headline question of Q1 2026 is no longer ‘has the ABSD shock passed?’ — it has not, and will not — but rather ‘which capital pools are still legitimately mobile in Singapore residential at the S$10M+ tier, and on what terms?’ (as of 2026-Q1).

This commentary tracks the answer through three lenses: caveat data from URA REALIS, off-market signals from SLA title registry trends, and the macro-monetary backdrop set by MAS. The pattern is consistent with what we observed across the four quarters of 2025: volumes are recovering selectively, prices remain firm at the trophy tier, and the buyer pool has narrowed but deepened (as of 2026-04).

For: Investors

Quarterly snapshot of Singapore's $10M+ property market — GCB landed plus ultra-luxury condos.

353
$10M+ trades (12 mo)
17
GCB
72
Ultra-Condo

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Early Q1 2026 caveat compilations point to approximately 22–28 non-landed CCR units transacted at S$10 million and above, broadly in line with Q4 2025’s pace and roughly three to four times the trough of Q1 2024 (which saw only 7 such trades). The reading is not heroic — full-year 2022 had recorded 56 such transactions across all twelve months — but Q1 2026 confirms the structural floor that emerged through 2025 is holding (as of 2026-Q1).

What is more telling than the count is the buyer-mix composition. Foreign buyers’ share of CCR purchases, which collapsed from 15.8% in Q1 2023 to single digits in 2023–2024, stabilised around the 8–10% range through 2025 and entered Q1 2026 at the upper end of that band. Crucially, that residual foreign share is now dominated by permanent residents rather than non-resident buyers paying the full 60% ABSD — a structural shift the IRAS rate schedule mechanically forces and that the IRAS BSD/ABSD framework codifies (as of 2026-03).

On the GCB side, the read is more granular but directionally clearer. Singapore Land Authority title-search activity and broker-reported off-market closings suggest Q1 2026 GCB transaction value tracked the strong run-rate set in 2025, when full-year caveated GCB value comfortably exceeded the 2024 benchmark. Q1 alone is not a clean read for GCB — the segment routinely transacts 35–55 trades a year with material seasonality — but several headline closings in the Tanglin, Holland and Bukit Timah belts crossed the wire in February and March, with two reported deals above S$80 million each (as of 2026-03).

Price-per-square-foot data tells the most interesting story. The Q1 2024 Tanglin Hill trade at S$6,197 psf looked like an outlier two years ago. Through 2025, multiple GCB transactions cleared above S$5,500 psf on a land-area basis, and Q1 2026 data points show several deals in the S$5,000–S$6,500 psf range — meaning the 2024 outlier has become the 2026 reference point for prime locations. For non-landed ultra-luxury, the per-square-foot story is starker: penthouse-grade units in Districts 9 and 10 cleared at S$5,000–S$6,200 psf in selected Q1 2026 caveats, with branded-residence projects continuing to price at a 15–25% premium to non-branded comparables on the same street (as of 2026-Q1).

The volume-price divergence is now a multi-year feature, not a quarterly anomaly. The MAS TDSR framework remains largely non-binding at this tier because most ultra-luxury buyers transact in cash or with conservative loan-to-value ratios, so headline interest-rate moves — including the gradual normalisation of SORA-linked mortgage rates through 2025 — have not been the marginal driver. Instead, what moves Q1 2026 pricing is the combination of constrained new supply at the very top, a deeper-than-expected pool of Singapore Citizen and Permanent Resident buyers backed by both inherited wealth and family-office-anchored fortunes, and the fact that the segment’s sellers are not under any forced-sale pressure (as of 2026-Q1).

Putting these strands together: Q1 2026 was a quarter of consolidation, not breakout. Volumes are healed but not bullish, prices are firm but not parabolic, and the buyer mix has matured into a steady-state composition that reflects six full quarters of post-ABSD market structure (as of 2026-04).

  • Singapore Citizen or Permanent Resident upgrader targeting GCB: Q1 2026 is the most active quarter for serious GCB enquiry in roughly three years — brokerage pipelines and SLA title-search activity both confirm this. Off-market opportunities are surfacing for buyers with verified funds and a defined geography. Use the stamp duty calculator to size your BSD and ABSD exposure (a Citizen second-property purchase at S$15M attracts 20% ABSD; a PR first-property purchase attracts 5% ABSD), then read the GCB investment structuring guide to plan financing and ownership entity (as of 2026-Q1).
  • Foreign national without PR: The 60% ABSD remains effectively prohibitive. On a S$15M condo, ABSD alone is S$9M before BSD — a structural rather than tactical barrier. Q1 2026 data confirms this has not moved and is not expected to. Where the entity buyer is a Free Trade Agreement national qualifying for a remission (US, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway under specific Singapore-citizen-equivalent terms), the calculation changes materially. Use the District 9 market overview and District 10 market overview to baseline pricing before engaging counsel on FTA eligibility (as of 2026-03).
  • Family office or wealth-management structure: The 2023–2024 tightening of Section 13O and 13U has rebalanced the route by which family-office capital touches Singapore residential. Direct purchase by an incentivised fund vehicle is generally not the route — principals tend to acquire under personal or non-incentivised holding-entity ownership. Read the Singapore family office property strategy guide for the approved structures and the residential carve-outs that apply, and track location-specific GCB clusters on the luxury property map (as of 2026-Q1).
  • Investor benchmarking ultra-luxury returns: Q1 2026’s CCR price firmness should not be over-extrapolated into a forward return assumption. Gross yields in the segment remain structurally low (often sub-2% on S$10M+ assets), so total return depends almost entirely on capital appreciation, which in turn depends on a small number of high-value transactions clearing each year. Use the ROI calculator and the holding returns insight tool to stress-test 0%, 3% and 5% annual appreciation scenarios over a 7- and 10-year horizon before committing (as of 2026-Q1).
  1. Reconstruct the Q1 2026 caveat list yourself. Headline aggregations vary by source. Pull raw data from URA REALIS filtered to postal districts 9, 10 and 11 with a floor price of S$10 million, then cross-reference with SLA title searches for GCB area transactions. Doing this once a quarter gives you a far better read than any single market report (as of 2026-04).
  2. Model your total acquisition cost line-by-line before viewing. At S$10M+, BSD alone runs to roughly S$600,000; ABSD depending on buyer profile adds anywhere from zero (first-property Citizen) to S$9M+ (foreign individual). Run both the stamp duty calculator and the total cost of purchase calculator with conservative inputs (legal fees, valuation, agent commission) so the financial envelope is non-negotiable before negotiation begins.
  3. Verify planning parameters on the asset, not on the marketing brochure. Every gazetted GCB area has bespoke planning controls under URA’s Master Plan — lot-size minima, plot-ratio caps, height limits, covenant overlays. Cross-check on the master plan map and pull the title search before any letter of intent. Read the dedicated profiles for Nassim Road, Cluny Park and Holland Park if those areas are on your shortlist.
  4. Calibrate to per-district psf trend, not headline trophy deals. The Q1 2026 print at S$5,000–S$6,500 psf on selected GCB land is a meaningful reference point but not a uniform clearing price. Review the longer-run trajectory in the GCB price trend article so the offer you make sits on the right side of the per-district curve. Avoid anchoring solely to the most-publicised headline.
  5. Quantify the freehold-vs-999-year-leasehold differential explicitly. Several of Singapore’s most coveted GCB enclaves include 999-year leasehold parcels alongside freehold. The economic difference is usually small but the perception premium for freehold remains. Use the lease decay calculator to put a number on the residual-value differential over a 25–40 year holding period and decide whether the asking-price gap is justified (as of 2026-Q1).
  6. Engage a CEA-registered specialist with a transactional record, not just a brochure. Off-market activity remains a material share of GCB and S$10M+ condo flow. The CEA public register lets you verify any salesperson’s credentials in 30 seconds; the advisor finder can surface specialists with the relevant district and tier experience.

The bearish counter to a constructive Q1 2026 read is non-trivial and worth airing in full. First, the ‘firm prices on thin volume’ pattern can persist for several quarters before breaking decisively in one direction, and history (notably 2014–2015 in Singapore prime, and several international parallels) suggests these standoffs often resolve to the downside once a marginal seller capitulates. Q1 2026’s 22–28 CCR S$10M+ trades remains a fraction of the 56-deal full-year 2022 benchmark, and any narrative built on a single quarter of stable volumes risks anchoring on noise (as of 2026-Q1).

Second, the tightening of MAS’s family-office incentive criteria in 2023 and the subsequent compliance enforcement through 2024–2025 may have a delayed effect on residential demand from this channel. Family offices granted incentives under the older, more permissive regime are largely grandfathered, but the marginal new entrant now faces stiffer minimum-AUM, professional-staffing and local-investment thresholds. If the inflow of newly-approved Single Family Offices slows materially in 2026–2027, the structural underpinning of prime residential demand could thin. The honest reading is that we will not know with confidence until late 2026 or 2027 whether this is a real headwind or a non-event (as of 2026-04).

Third, supply matters. Several prime CCR new launches are expected through 2026–2027, including projects in the Orchard and Bukit Timah belts whose pricing strategy will reset comparable benchmarks. A single aggressively-priced launch can pull resale comparables down by 5–10% in the affected micro-market, even if the launch itself sells through. Buyers waiting on the sidelines should treat the upcoming launch pipeline as the single largest variable in their Q2–Q4 2026 calculus (as of 2026-Q1).

How many S$10M+ ultra-luxury condo transactions took place in Q1 2026?
Early caveat compilations from URA REALIS point to roughly 22–28 non-landed CCR units transacting at S$10 million and above in Q1 2026 — broadly in line with Q4 2025 and roughly three to four times the Q1 2024 trough of 7 trades. Final figures will firm up once all caveats lodge by mid-Q2 2026; consult URA REALIS for the authoritative count (as of 2026-04).
Has the foreigner share of CCR purchases recovered from the 2023 ABSD shock?
Partially and selectively. Foreigners’ share of CCR caveats stabilised in the 8–10% range through 2025 and entered Q1 2026 at the upper end of that band, but the composition is now dominated by Permanent Residents (who face 5% ABSD on a first property) rather than non-resident buyers paying the full 60%. The pre-2023 norm of 13–16% foreigner share has not returned and is not expected to in the current rate regime (as of 2026-03).
How are MAS’s Section 13O and 13U changes affecting ultra-luxury residential demand?
The 2023 tightening (higher minimum AUM, mandatory professional staffing, local-investment requirements) and subsequent enforcement reshape how family-office capital touches Singapore residential rather than whether it does. Principals typically acquire under personal or non-incentivised holding-entity ownership rather than via the incentivised fund vehicle. The marginal effect on Q1 2026 ultra-luxury demand has been modest and is largely already in the price; the bigger uncertainty is the pace of newly-approved Single Family Office set-ups through 2026–2027 (as of 2026-04).
Why have GCB prices kept rising even as transaction counts remain below the 2021–2022 peak?
Three reasons: constrained supply (only ~2,800 GCBs exist in 39 gazetted areas, with very limited turnover), deep buyer demand from the domestic ultra-high-net-worth cohort (who are not subject to the punitive 60% ABSD), and the absence of forced-sale pressure on sellers (most are not financially distressed). When motivated sellers do appear, they meet a highly selective but committed buyer pool, and prices clear above expectation. Review the longer-run trend in the GCB price trend analysis for the per-district trajectory (as of 2026-Q1).
What does the Q1 2026 read mean for someone considering a S$10M+ CCR condo purchase in Q2 or Q3 2026?
It means the market is unlikely to discount meaningfully from current levels in the near term — the data does not support either a bullish breakout or a sharp correction. The biggest single variable for Q2–Q4 2026 is the new-launch pipeline in the Orchard and Bukit Timah belts: an aggressively-priced launch can pull resale comparables down by 5–10% in the affected micro-market. Buyers with a defined target should be modelling acquisition costs now using the total cost of purchase calculator rather than waiting for definitive top or bottom signals (as of 2026-04).
Is the headline +CCR price-index print in Q1 2026 a reliable signal of capital growth?
Treat it with care. With only ~500–600 CCR caveated transactions per quarter in the current regime — a fraction of the 2021–2022 cycle — index movements can reflect compositional change (the cheapest trades dropping out) rather than asset-level appreciation. Use the ROI calculator and the holding returns insight tool for individual-asset analysis rather than relying on aggregate index moves (as of 2026-Q1).
Where should I track GCB activity between official URA flash estimates?
Three sources work well in combination: URA REALIS caveats (the official transactional record, lagged by a few weeks for lodgement), SLA title searches via the SLA estate-market information portal (which catches some off-market transfers caveats miss), and broker channels for off-market deal flow (which is not publicly reported at all). For visual orientation, the luxury property map plots known ultra-luxury clusters across districts 9, 10 and 11 plus the gazetted GCB areas (as of 2026-04).